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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS i 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA G. SMITH (TAYLOR), : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : 
SCOTT G. SMITH, : Case No. 890025 CA 
Category 7 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over 
this domestic relations child custody matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (Supp. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 30-3-5, 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant/Appellant (Scott Smith) seeks to modify the 
Decree of Divorce by first attempting to show a substantial change 
of circumstances for purposes of changing child custody; and that 
it is in the best interest and welfare of the child to modify the 
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Decree of Divorce. 
B. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Ray M. Harding, in an Order of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, ruled that Scott Smith's Petition to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce was to be dismissed in that there was 
not a showing of substantial and material change of circumstances 
to warrant a change of custody. 
Prior to the trial, a Motion in Limine was granted to 
restrict evidence prior to December 14, 1984, pertaining to 
matters which were previously litigated before the Court in an 
Order to Show Cause hearing in re contempt. 
C. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND RELEVANT FACTS 
On April 13, 1981, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, of 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, entered a 
Decree of Divorce to the captioned parties thereby granting 
custody of the parties minor child, Jesse, to Patricia Taylor. (R. 
15-16). The Defendant Scott Smith was not present at the hearing 
as he had executed a Consent and Waiver for Entry of Judgment 
which had been duly filed with the Court. Scott Smith executed 
this Consent and Waiver through an attorney and acknowledged that 
he had been given the opportunity to consult with an attorney 
prior to its execution. (R. 5-6). 
In the Consent and Waiver, Scott Smith consents that his 
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default may be entered consistent with the provisions contained in 
the Amended Complaint which states that the Plaintiff (Patricia 
Taylor) is a fit and proper parent and should be awarded the sole 
care and custody of the minor child of the parties. (R. 1-3). 
On August 21r 1981, the Honorable Maurice Harding of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court entered an Order Modifying the 
Decree (R. 27-28) which specifically defined Scott's visitation. 
This Order was a result of the Court's holding a hearing on 
Scott's Motion for Order to Show Cause filed July 20f 1981. (R. 
19). The purpose of this Order to Show Cause was to further 
establish visitation rights. 
A subsequent Order to Show Cause hearing was heard on 
August 6, 1982/ before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, resulting 
in an Order dated the 17th day of August, 1982, wherein the 
Defendant was ordered to pay to the Clerk of the Court the sum of 
ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($125.00) per month for the 
support and maintenance of the minor child of the parties. Such 
money was to be held until the Court directed its further 
disposition. (R. 79-80). 
On August 15, 1984, an Order to Show Cause was issued on 
the Defendant Scott Smith's behalf (R. 91) for the purposes of 
finding the Plaintiff in contempt of court, and to modify the 
Decree of Divorce to specify visitation rights including locations 
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and times where the child could be picked up by appropriate 
parties for the Defendant's visitation. Complications regarding 
visitation had resulted due to the Plaintiff and the minor child 
moving to Mexico and then to Arizona. (R.89-90). 
The hearing on October 3, 1984, was continued to a later 
date due to the Plaintiff acquiring new counsel and due to her 
medical situation at that time. (R. 98-100). 
The hearing on Defendant's Order to Show Cause was held 
December 11, 1984, where both parties were present. On December 
14, 1984, Judge Bullock entered an Order Modifying Decree which 
set forth the Defendant's visitation rights in greater detail. 
The Court further found the Plaintiff to be in contempt of court 
for violating both the spirit and language of the Order regarding 
visitation. The Court further found that the Plaintiff may purge 
herself of said contempt by engaging in a course of conduct which 
will affirmatively effectuate the Defendant's visitation schedule. 
(R. 158-166). 
In the Order Modifying Decree, dated December 14f 1984, 
the Court modified paragraph 5 of the original Decree of Divorce 
providing that the Defendant Scott G. Smith be awarded certain 
custodial and visitation rights. (R.163-164). This was not for 
the purpose of diluting the Plaintiff Patricia Taylor's custody 
nor "to give joint custody as joint custody is generally 
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understood." (Tr. 577). The apparent purpose of awarding such 
custodial rights to the Defendant was to assist him in 
effectuating his visitation schedule from the Mexican authorities. 
(R. 130-133). 
During the process of these Order to Show Cause hearings 
resulting in different Orders Modifying the Decree/ the Defendant 
never petitioned the Court to award a change of custody of Jesse, 
nor tried to show a material change of circumstances which would 
justify a change of custody. 
On June 2, 1988, Patricia Taylor filed in Texas an 
original suit affecting the parent/child relationship as it 
relates to visitation and a temporary restraining order relating 
to the terms and conditions of this visitation. The temporary 
restraining order was filed on June 6, 1988, and a hearing was 
scheduled in Texas for June 21, 1988. (R. 283-290). 
On June 20, 1988, a conference call was held between 
Lupi Eggemeyer, Court Master for County Court at Law #5, El Paso, 
Texas, and Judge Ray Harding of the Utah County Court in Provo, 
Utah. It was mutually agreed upon that Scott Smith and Patricia 
Taylor were to be permanently restrained from engaging in any 
psychological manipulation or brain washing of Jesse. The 
visitation schedule was ordered to continue as set forth in the 
Utah Order. (R. 304-305). 
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On June 21, 1988, the Defendant filed a Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce for the purpose of awarding a change of 
custody of Jesse from the Plaintiff to the Defendant. The 
Petition states that the actions of contemptuous behavior of the 
Plaintiff constitutes a material change of circumstances which 
would justify awarding a change of custody. (R. 294-298). 
On July 27, 1988, Patricia Taylor through Utah counsel 
filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings stating that custody should be 
determined in Texas pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 45(c), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. (R. 306-313).. 
On September 15, 1988, Judge Harding entered a 
Memorandum Decision denying the Motion to Stay Proceedings, 
finding that jurisdiction over the custody of Jesse Smith 
continued to rest in the State of Utah. (R. 359). 
On December 9, 1988, Patricia Taylor filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment with regard to Defendant's Petition to Modify the 
Decree of Divorce to change the custody of Jesse. In an informal 
conference prior to trial, the Court denied such a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the grounds that there were material issues of 
fact which remained to be determined. (R. 405). 
On December 12, 1988, the Plaintiff made a Motion in 
Limine to prohibit the introduction of evidence prior to December 
14, 1984, since such evidence had previously been litigated before 
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the Court on December 11, 1984, which resulted in Plaintiff being 
held in contempt of court. (R. 419-420). Judge Harding granted 
such Motion in Limine on December 13, 1988. (R. 405-406). 
Trial was held on December 13f 1988, after which Judge 
Harding granted Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss in that there was 
not a material change of circumstances proven in order for the 
Court to shift custody to the Defendant. (R. 425-427). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When there has been an adjudication, it becomes Res 
Judicata as to those issues which were either tried and 
determined, or upon all issues which the party had a fair 
opportunity to present and have determined in other proceedings. 
On January 27, 1981, Defendant Scott Smith, being 
represented by an attorney entered into a Stipulation for divorce 
consenting that custody be awarded to Plaintiff who was "a fit and 
proper parent". A Decree of Divorce was subsequently entered on 
April 13, 1981. On August 21, 1981, some four (4) months after 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce, an Order to Show Cause hearing 
was held upon which the Court modified the Decree specifying 
Defendant's visitation. Defendant was again in Court on August 6, 
1982, for an Order to Show Cause hearing, being represented by 
counsel, of which further evidence was produced. Two (2) years 
later, December 11, 1984, and after an extensive hearing, the 
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Court again modified the Decree of Divorce further specifying 
Defendant's visitation rights; and after hearing all of the 
evidence the Court held Plaintiff in contempt of Court and entered 
an Order dated December 14/ 1989/ in which Plaintiff was entitled 
to purge herself by future conduct. 
In 1988 when Defendant petitioned the Court to again 
modify the Decree of Divorce, the Court properly granted 
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine preventing the presentation of the 
same evidence that had previously been litigated in the 1981/ 
1982/ and 1984 hearings for the purpose of showing a substantial 
change of circumstances. Defendant had the opportunity of asking 
the Court to change custody in 1984 and have the evidence that was 
presented considered as to whether it constituted a substantial 
change of circumstances. Having had that opportunity, he chose 
only to have it presented for the purpose of a contempt citation. 
To permit the Defendant to present the same evidence 
that was presented in 1981/ 1982/ and 1984 for the purpose of 
permitting Defendant to carry his burden of showing a substantial 
change of circumstances flies in the face of the doctrine of res 
judicata. Those facts have been judicially acted upon once, and 
the Court properly precluded those same facts to be relitigated on 
a different claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
FACTS PRIOR TO DECEMBER 14, 1934, PROPERLY EXCLUDED 
ON THE BASIS OF BEING RES JUDICATA 
Since thp r parties have been 
unable to agree ^..i. regard iu ui*e visitation the •: h 11 d , Jesse. 
This has required f'wo hearings and in December of 1984f a lengthy 
evidentiary hearing took plao *rhu'ii trie Defendant presented 
substantial evidence <•'. regard to the displeasures he 
expe us child. His evidence was convincing 
enough that the Plaint i:r was held in con tempi of Cuurt and given 
the opportunity r.. p..:-^ e herself by conduct in the future. The 
relief Defends . 11 December of 1984 was contempt, and 
specificity with regard r.-. fir *re visit-aM i riejtitb, Pot whatever 
reason he c. ' not choose to seek a change of custody. 
1 doctrine of res ludicata has a dua. purpose in (1) 
barring t"1 prosecution of. a second action upon • - - dine olaim, 
demand, 01 uause of actior 3 preclude ; > relitigation 
of particular" facts ru" is:: •• nother action between the same 
parties on a different claim or cause of action. -Hi AmJur^nd sec. 
39 4, 
Res judicata, has the two branches of claim, preclusion 
and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion prohibits the relit iqa+ ion 
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of claims which have previously been litigated between the same 
parties, and also prevents claims which "could and should have 
been litigated in the prior action, but were not raised." Masters 
v. Worsley, 777 P2d 121, 503 (Utah App. 1989); Copper State Thrift 
and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P2d 387, 389 (Utah App. 1987). Issue 
preclusion (collateral estoppel) applies when the issues have been 
"competently, fully and fairly litigated" in the "context of a 
different cause of action." Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently outlined the doctrine 
of res judicata in divorce actions. In Throckmorton v. 
Throckmorton, 767 P2d 121 (Utah App. 1988) the Court stated: 
"When there has been an adjudication, it becomes 
res judicata as to those issues which were either 
tried and determined, or upon all issues which the 
party had a fair opportunity to present and have 
determined in the other proceedings." 
Because the Defendant has fully litigated Plaintiff's 
behavior prior to December of 1984, the Court properly ruled that 
its relitigation should be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
The Defendant Scott Smith, at the time of the contempt hearing had 
ample opportunity to show that there was a substantial change of 
circumstances and ask for a change of custody and a modification 
of the original Decree of Divorce but he chose not to do so. 
The Defendant Scott Smith wants the opportunity of 
relitigating all of his previous evidence that was heard in the 
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contempt proceeding. He now urges upon the Court that SII 
in i t J ally entered a consent and waiver that the Court, has really 
never heard evidence with ;c^ • tjest i interest and welfare 
of the child This poiu ;s not wei.i raken since it is eight (8) 
yean:; f: - ^  - lime that the divorce was heard and tuur (4) years 
since the evidence he wants to r e I 11.1 qaU,» wa:,;j i:.resent ed , 
The Defendant relies on Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P2d b99 (Utah 
1989) whicl I states ttidi the res judicata aspect of the strict 
"changed circumstances" rule ot the Hogge t wu-prongtMi tesl IinIS r Be 
"subservient to the best interest of •"•.** child." IeL_ at bOJ. See 
Hogge v. Hogge, •: ."M OI lUtau iio<?: In Elmer , the 
Court pointed out that where custody deter .*t , ns tn« M » 
adjudicated ustody award made I i *:auR divorce case 
by stipula* . ?s jtitli cat*: p< .icy underlying the ehanged-
circumstances rule is at a particula, v low ebb." Elmer , 
in that case however, there were no subsequent hearings (as ,i uie 
present case) of whu, h the pi.i»*?")i^  seek i mj u.) change custod' r^aa 
ampul opportunity to show a material change of a-
I. he purpose of changing custody. 
The riaiiii i I I , l\i! i l»'M Tdyl -i . does not necessarily 
claim res judicata to the facts stipulated I IO in t :he default 
lecree, but to the facts litigated in subsequent hearings 
prior LC December 14r 1984, r'he..-~: .e strict "changed 
circumstances" rule of the Hogge two-pronged test is still 
applicable. 
Sec. 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
provides that the Court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and maintenance 
of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of 
property as is reasonable and necessary. 
Pursuant to this language, the Court may modify the 
Divorce Decree "as shall be reasonable and necessary". Because of 
a variety of circumstances in domestic disputes, "no firm rule can 
be uniformly applied in all divorce cases and each must be 
determined upon the basis of the immediate fact situation". 
Hunsaker v. Fake, 563 P2d 784 (Utah 1977); Wilson v. Wilson, 5 
Utah2d 79, 82; 296 P2d 977, 979 (1956). 
Allowing the past contempt proceedings to be reentered 
which has already been adjudicated would not enable the Court to 
determine a substantial change of circumstances "on the basis of 
the immediate fact situation". The Court specifically found that 
Plaintiff's conduct has improved since she was found to be in 
contempt of Court although such improvements were not deemed 
sufficient to constitute purging herself of that conduct. Thus, 
the contempt proceeding is moot, it is res judicata, and it was 
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totally proper not to al 1 ow the same pvi - - - , -
on the question of whether or n.-. substantia ^nange 
circumstances had oeeiii red. 
A two prong test, has been established mi considering 
the request to change custody awards. This test is enunciated 
basically in two cases, Hogge v. Hogge, 849 P2d 51 (uiar L98 2) and 
Becker v. Becker, 694 P2d 608 (Utah 1984). The test was recent I y 
out J I ned in Kramei v, Kramer, 738 P2d 624 (Utah 1987). In Kramer 
the Court stated: 
"Under the first prong, the parties seeking 
modification must show that there has been a change 
in the circumstances upon which the original 
custody award was based which substantially and 
materially effects the custodial parents parenting 
ability or the functioning of the custodial 
relationship which justifies reopening the custody 
question. Once a substantial change of 
circumstances has been established, the petitioner 
must show under the second prong that the requested 
change in custody is in the best interest of the 
child." 
The purpose of the two part Hogge test is founded upon 
the premise that stable custody arrangements are of critical 
importance i >« * «M-» n n M ' s proper development. In the Kramer case 
(supra, at 628) the court stated: 
"For this reason, whei i the trial court is asked to 
determine whether there has been a change of 
circumstances sufficient to warrant the reopening 
of the custody Decree, ordinarily it must focus 
exclusively on the parenting ability of the 
custodial parent and the functioning of the 
established custodial relationship," 
In Becker (supra, at 610) the Court held that the 
standard requires that: 
"the asserted change in circumstances have some 
material relationship to and substantial effect 
upon parenting ability for the functioning of the 
presently existing custodial relationship." 
The Court was therefore not only proper in ruling that 
the pre-December 14, 1984, evidence was barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata, the trial court should also be affirmed on the basis 
that pre-December 14, 1984, evidence could have no relationship to 
immediate fact situation, nor could it be material as to the 
presently existing custodial relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
IN A PRIOR CONTEMPT HEARING SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED 
TO BE RELITIGATED AT A SUBSEQUENT HEARING FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF SHOWING A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Appellant's points are not well taken because the 
evidence presented at the December 14, 1984, hearing should not be 
relitigated for the purposes of showing a substantial change of 
circumstances in 1988. Such evidence was properly precluded for 
the following reasons: 
1. Res judicata; 
2. A determination of substantial change of 
circumstances should be based on an immediate fact situation; and 
3. Pre-December 14, 1984, conduct would be contrary 
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to showing a substantial change of circumstances on paiem u\q 
ability 01 functioning of the presently existing custodial 
relationship. 
DATED this day of November, 1989. 
ROBERT L. MOODY 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on. fh<=> ^ _ da T N< vember , 1989, 
I mail^u a u , r correct copy :' : >• foregoing to Wayne B. 
Watson- At-tor i- - - .- *r.i>ej.j.cini., AO-»C North University 
Ave,,- Suite 220, Provo, Utah 84604; postage prepaid. 
15 
